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Abstract—In most of modern enterprise systems, redundancy
configuration is often considered to provide availability during the
part of such systems is being patched. However, the redundancy
may increase the attack surface of the system. In this paper, we
model and assess the security and capacity oriented availability
of multiple server redundancy designs when applying security
patches to the servers. We construct (1) a graphical security
model to evaluate the security under potential attacks before
and after applying patches, (2) a stochastic reward net model
to assess the capacity oriented availability of the system with a
patch schedule. We present our approach based on case study and
model-based evaluation for multiple design choices. The results
show redundancy designs increase capacity oriented availability
but decrease security when applying security patches. We define
functions that compare values of security metrics and capacity
oriented availability with the chosen upper/lower bounds to
find design choices that satisfy both security and availability
requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, most enterprises have a centralized patch man-
agement system in order to install vendors patches efficiently
and enhance their systems security level. A security patch
is an update to fix vulnerabilities in the software to prevent
systems from possible exploits. However, some critical secu-
rity patches require systems reboot. When a server is under
security patch, it cannot provide normal service and introduce
downtime. In order to improve the availability, most enterprises
have redundant servers with high availability configuration
(e.g., active-active or active-standby). Ironically, this kind of
redundancy may increase the attack surface because of the
increased number of servers. An attack surface of a system
refers to the total number of vulnerabilities that are accessible
to an attacker [1]. From this view, an attacker has more number
of vulnerabilities when redundancy provision is used. Besides,
it is not feasible to patch all vulnerabilities of the servers due
to time and cost constraints. Therefore, it is important to find
the balance between the security and availability affected by
the security patch to facilitate the better redundancy design for
enterprise systems.
Graphical security models (e.g., attack graphs (AGs) [2], at-
tack trees (ATs) [3]) have been widely used to assess the cyber
security. In particular, an AG captures all possible sequences
of an attacker’s actions to compromise the target, and an AT
explores possible ways that how an attack goal is achieved via
combinations of attacks. In order to improve the scalability
problem of AGs and ATs, the multi-layer hierarchical attack
representation model (HARM) [4] was proposed to combine
AGs and ATs. In the two-layered HARM, the upper layer
represents the network reachability information (i.e., nodes
connected in the topological structure) and the lower layer
denotes the vulnerability information of nodes, respectively.
Stochastic models have been applied to assess the availabil-
ity. Stochastic Reward Net (SRN) was developed as a modeling
formalism for the automatic generation and solution of the
underlying continuous time Markov chain (CTMC). SRNs can
be automatically constructed and converted into CTMC models
using software packages such as SHARPE [5] and SPNP [6].
In this work, we construct a graphical security model (we
used a HARM) to analyze the security of enterprise networks
under potential attacks before and after patch, and a stochastic
model (we used a SRN) to assess the system availability
with patch schedule. To the best of our knowledge, this work
is the first approach to evaluate both security and capacity
oriented availability of redundancy designs under the security
patch. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• Use model-based evaluation to investigate the impact
of security patch on security and capacity oriented
availability of enterprise networks;
• Compare the security and capacity oriented availabil-
ity of multiple design choices for server redundancy;
• Find the design choices which satisfy both the security
and availability requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents related work for modeling both security and depend-
ability. Our proposed approach is described in Section III.
Numerical analysis using the proposed approach is presented in
Section IV. Limitations and potential extensions are presented
in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There are extensive works on applying graphical security
models in analyzing security and stochastic models assessing
availability for various systems.
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Graphical security models: Roy et al. [7] proposed
attack countermeasure trees (ACTs) for the qualitative and
probabilistic security analysis by taking into account defense
mechanisms on the nodes. They implemented the ACT in the
SHARPE [5] and showed the usability of their model in case
study. Albanese et al. [8] used AGs to compute the minimum-
cost network hardening solution. The experiments were carried
out using synthetic attack graphs and the results validated the
performance of their approach. Hong et al. [4] developed the
multi-layered HARM and performed the scalability analysis
compared with the single layer AGs in terms of model con-
struction and evaluation. The simulation results demonstrated
that the HARM is more scalable than the single layer AG.
Availability models: Kim et al. [9] proposed a hierarchical
approach to model the availability of the non-virtualized and
virtualized systems using the fault tree for the system and the
CTMC for the components. Trivedi et al. [10] presented several
case studies on assessing the availability of real systems from
Motorola, Cisco and Sun Microsystems via stochastic models.
There are a few work focused on considering both security
and dependability. Trivedi et al. [11] proposed a new classifi-
cation of dependability and security models and showed case
studies for both the individual and composite models. Wang
et al. [12] developed an intrusion tolerant architecture for dis-
tributed servers based on fault tolerant computing techniques
to mitigate the impact of both known and unknown attacks.
Bangalore et al. [13] proposed the method of self-cleansing
intrusion tolerance based on the virtualization technique by
reducing the server’s exposure time to less than a minute.
The experiment results showed lower exposure time leads to
slightly larger response time but yields higher security level.
Yu et al. [14] evaluated the survivability (both statically and
under sustained attacks) and costs of three virtual machine
based architectures using the analytical methods. Ramasamy
et al. [15] used combinatorial modeling to analyze the impact
of virtualization on the single physical node based on the
assumption that module failures are independent.
III. A PROPOSED APPROACH
Fig. 1: The proposed approach.
The approach consists of three phases shown in Figure 1:
1) data input, 2) model construction, and 3) evaluation. We
explain each phase in the following.
In the phase 1, the administrator needs to provide four types
of inputs: the network topology (i.e., reachability information),
node vulnerability information, failure and recovery behaviors
of the nodes in the network (i.e., interactions between nodes
due to failure and recovery, failure and recovery rates), and
patch schedule (i.e., how often to patch, which vulnerabilities
to be patched). The vulnerability information includes the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID, the Com-
mon Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score [16] and
other metric-based values assigned to the vulnerability (e.g.,
attack success probability, attack impact). The network topol-
ogy and vulnerability information are used as inputs into the
security model generator. The failure and recovery behaviors,
patch schedule and the related vulnerability information are
used as inputs into the availability model generator.
In the phase 2, we perform the construction of two models
(security and availability) based on the inputs separately. First,
the security model generator automatically generates a two-
layered HARM for the network with the potential attack paths
captured in the upper layer. Second, we use SPNP [6] as
the availability model generator and manually construct the
SRN model. An automated SRN model construction can be
performed as in [17].
In the phase 3, we carry out the evaluation of security
and availability. The security evaluator computes two types
of security metrics: path-based (e.g., number of attack paths)
and non-path-based (e.g., attack success probability). Other
security analysis is also possible to perform as in [18]. The
availability evaluator outputs measures (e.g., capacity oriented
availability) using the module in the SPNP which takes the
pre-defined reward functions. Security metrics and availability
measures can be combined for further analysis as shown in
Section IV-A.
If there are any changes about the network (e.g., new vul-
nerabilities are found), both models should be re-constructed
with the new inputs. In this paper, we only consider one-time
patch (e.g., monthly patch of a specific month) and analyze
the impact of the patch in terms of security and availability.
More complex cases (e.g., monthly patch of 3 months) will be
considered in our future work.
A. An Example Enterprise Network
We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach using case
study. We present an example enterprise network along with
the potential attacker model at first and then build the HARM
and availability model. Our proposed approach is not limited to
this specific case but applicable to general enterprise networks.
We assume the enterprise network uses a 3-tier client-server
architecture for its web service. The network is divided into
three subnets by the external and internal firewalls shown in
Figure 2. The web servers are deployed in the demilitarized
zone (DMZ). The application servers and database server
are located in the intranet. There is also a domain name
service (DNS) server responding to the domain name queries
in another DMZ. Both web servers and application servers
use active-active high availability cluster configuration. The
redundant servers are identical in terms of both hardware and
software.
We make assumptions for the services running on the
servers: the DNS server runs Windows Server 2012 R2 and
Microsoft DNS; the web server runs Red Hat Enterprise Linux
and Apache HTTP; the application server runs Oracle Linux 7
and Oracle WebLogic; the database server runs Oracle Linux
7 and MySQL. All the chosen operating systems (OSs) and
service software are commonly used in the enterprise networks.
Fig. 2: An example enterprise network.
We collect the vulnerability information for each server
from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and use the
vulnerabilities for the example network before patch. In the
real networks, vulnerabilities can be collected from scanning
tools. Each vulnerability has a base score from the CVSS to
indicate its severity. We denote the exploitable vulnerabilities
as vulnerabilities which can be exploited by a remote attacker
to gain some level of privileges. We denote critical vulnerabil-
ities as vulnerabilities with the CVSS base score higher than
8.0. A vulnerability can be both exploitable and critical, or
neither exploitable nor critical.
Each server has a patch schedule. We only consider the
regular patch for security vulnerabilities and use monthly patch
(30 days) for the network as patches are usually released
monthly. Other patch management will be considered in our
future work. As it is impossible to patch every vulnerability
due to cost ant downtime, scenarios of patching critical vul-
nerabilities will be taken into account.
B. An Attacker Model
We make the following assumptions for the capability of an
attacker as follows. The attacker is located outside the network
and the attack goal is to compromise the database server(s)
through privilege escalation attacks. The effort required to
compromise one server has no correlation with the effort
required to compromise another server (e.g., a single attack
tool cannot exploit a vulnerability in the web server and
another vulnerability in the application server).
C. Construction of HARMs
We make use of the two-layered HARM proposed in [4].
We choose the following metrics in our security evaluation:
the attack success probability, attack impact, number of ex-
ploitable vulnerabilities, number of attack paths and number of
entry points [19]. The CVSS base score of each vulnerability
is calculated from the impact and exploitability scores. We
extract the value of attack success probability from the CVSS
exploitability score by dividing the score by 10. We use the
impact score as the value of attack impact. We present the
impact and probability values for the exploitable vulnerabilities
in Table I.
We construct the two-layered HARMs for the example
enterprise network before and after patch in Figure 3(a)
and 3(b), respectively. In the HARM, the upper layer represents
the network reachability information using an AG (e.g., in
Figure 3(a), an attacker A is able to reach the target db1 via
dns1, (web1 or web2), (app1 or app2)) and the lower layer
denotes the vulnerability information of each server using ATs
(e.g., in Figure 3(a), an attacker A is able to exploit either
TABLE I: Vulnerability information of the example network.
Vulnerability CVE ID Attack Attack successimpact probability
v1dns CVE-2016-3227 10.0 1.0
v1web CVE-2016-4448 10.0 1.0
v2web CVE-2015-4602 10.0 1.0
v3web CVE-2015-4603 10.0 1.0
v4web CVE-2016-4979 2.9 1.0
v5web CVE-2016-4805 10.0 0.39
v1app CVE-2016-3586 10.0 1.0
v2app CVE-2016-3510 10.0 1.0
v3app CVE-2016-3499 10.0 1.0
v4app CVE-2016-0638 6.4 1.0
v5app CVE-2016-4997 10.0 0.39
v1db CVE-2016-6662 10.0 1.0
v2db CVE-2016-0639 10.0 1.0
v3db CVE-2015-3152 2.9 0.86
v4db CVE-2016-3471 10.0 0.39
v5db CVE-2016-4997 10.0 0.39
v1web , or v2web , or v3web , or both v4web and v5web to gain the root
permission of the web server).
(a) Before patch is complete.
(b) After patch is complete.
Fig. 3: HARMs of the example network.
The number of exploitable vulnerabilities in the network is
calculated by adding the number of exploitable vulnerabilities
in each server. As the potential attack paths are captured in
the HARM, the number of attack paths and number of entry
points are calculated in the upper layer of the HARM. For
the attack impact and attack success probability, values in
the higher levels are calculated from the lower levels. All
the equations can be found in [18], [20], [21]. We show an
example of calculating the attack impact in the vulnerability,
node, attack path and network levels for the network before
patch to demonstrate how the security analysis is carried out
using the HARM.
Let aimrootsvr denote the attack impact calculated recur-
sively in the corresponding AT containing the vulnerability
information for a server svr, aimsvr denote the attack impact
in the node level. We calculate aimrootweb1 and assign the value
to aimweb1 in the following.
aimweb1 = aimrootweb1 = max(v1web , v2web , v3web , v4web + v5web )
= max(10.0, 10.0, 10.0, 12.9) = 12.9
Let ap denote the attack path captured in the HARM. We
use ap1 = {dns1,web1, app1, db1} and calculate aimap1 in
the following.
aimap1 = aimdns1 + aimweb1 + aimapp1 + aimdb1
= 10.0 + 12.9 + 16.4 + 12.9 = 52.2
Let AP denote all the attack paths captured in the HARM,
AIM denote the attack impact in the network level. We cal-
culate AIM befp for the network before patch in the following.
AIM befp = max
ap∈APbefp
aimap = 52.2
We show the security metrics for the HARMs before and
after patch in Table II. We denote the attack success probability
as ASP , number of exploitable vulnerabilities as NoEV ,
number of attack paths as NoAP and number of entry points
as NoEP . From the results, we can conclude that patching the
critical vulnerabilities increases the security of the example
network.
TABLE II: Security metrics for the example network.
HARM
Metric
AIM ASP NoEV NoAP NoEP
Before patch 52.2 1.0 25 8 3
After patch 42.2 0.265 11 4 2
D. Construction of Availability Models
We assume a server consists of the hardware, OS and
applications supporting the service. The server has both OS
and application vulnerabilities to be patched. One or more
of patches might require a reboot after installation to make
the patches effective. There is no requirement of reboot be-
tween patches. At each patch period, application patches are
performed at first and OS patches are performed immediately
after application patches complete. Reboot occurs after both
application and OS patches are finished in order to merge the
reboot time. Other patch scenarios will be considered in our
future work.
We make the following assumptions for the failure and
recovery behaviors of the components in a server. Hardware
may fail at anytime but will not fail during the patch period.
Both OS and applications are subject to software failures. All
patches are tested first in a pre-production environment before
applying to production. So there are no software failures during
the patch period. In addition, OS will not fail when it is ready
to patch and applications will not fail when it is ready to patch.
Other failure and recovery behaviors will be incorporated in
our future work.
We construct a hierarchical SRN model to evaluate the
availability of the example network. The upper layer SRN
sub-models shown in Figure 4 capture the dependencies of
the servers in the network; the lower layer SRN sub-models
shown in Figure 5 capture the dependencies of the components
in a server. We describe the lower layer SRN sub-models in
Section III-D1 at first and the upper layer SRN sub-models
in III-D2 because the input parameters in the upper layer sub-
models are calculated from the lower layer sub-models.
Fig. 4: SRN sub-models for the network.
1) SRN sub-models for a server: The SRN sub-models for
a server consists of (a) hardware model, (b) OS model, (c)
service model and (d) patch clock model. All the associated
guard functions are defined in Table III where svc denotes the
service provided by a server.
TABLE III: Guard functions in the SRN sub-models for a
server.
Guard Definition
gosd if (#Phwd == 1) 1 else 0
gosdrb if (#Phwup == 1) 1 else 0
gosfup if (#Phwup == 1) 1 else 0
gosptrig if (#Psvcp == 1) 1 else 0
gosp if (#Phwup == 1) 1 else 0
gosrpd if (#Phwd == 1) 1 else 0
gospd if (#Phwd == 1) 1 else 0
gosprb if (#Phwup == 1) 1 else 0
gsvcd if (#Phwd == 1 || #Posfd == 1) 1 else 0
gsvcdrb if (#Phwup == 1 && #Posup == 1) 1 else 0
gsvcfup if (#Phwup == 1 && #Posup == 1) 1 else 0
gsvcptrig if (#Ptrigger == 1) 1 else 0
gsvcp if (#Phwup == 1 && #Posup == 1) 1 else 0
gsvcrpd if (#Phwd == 1 || #Posfd == 1) 1 else 0
gsvcrrb if (#Posp == 1) 1 else 0
gsvcrrbd if (#Phwd == 1 || #Posfd == 1) 1 else 0
gsvcprb if (#Phwup == 1 && #Posup == 1) 1 else 0
ginterval
if (#Psvcup == 1 || #Psvcd == 1 || #Psvcfd == 1) 1
else 0
gpolicy if (#Psvcp == 1) 1 else 0
greset if (#Posp == 1) 1 else 0
In Figure 5(a), there is one token in place Phwup represent-
ing all typical hardware components of a server. Firing of Thwd
represents the failure of any hardware component and firing of
Thwup represents the recovery of the failed component.
In Figure 5(b), there is one token in place Posup rep-
resenting the OS of a server. A token will be deposited in
place Posd due to hardware failure by firing one of the three
immediate transitions: Tosd , Tosrpd , Tospd . The transition Tosfd
is fired when the OS fails. The immediate transition Tosptrig is
triggered when the application patch is finished. A token will
be put in place Posp once OS patch is finished by firing Tosp .
(a) Hardware.
(b) OS. (c) Service.
(d) Patch clock.
Fig. 5: SRN sub-models for a server.
In Figure 5(c), there is one token in place Psvcup repre-
senting the applications supporting the service of a server. A
token will be deposited in place Psvcd due to hardware or
OS failure by firing one of the three immediate transitions:
Tsvcd , Tsvcrpd , Tsvcrrbd . The transition Tsvcfd is fired when any
service application fails. The immediate transition Tsvcptrig is
triggered when a token is in place Ptrigger of the patch clock
model. A token will be put in place Psvcp once application
patch is finished by firing Tsvcp . The immediate transition
Tsvcrrb is triggered when the OS patch completes (i.e., a token
in place Posp).
In Figure 5(d), there is one token in place Pclock repre-
senting the patch clock of a server. The transition Tinterval is
fired once per month. The immediate transition Tpolicy is fired
when the service is up. The immediate transition Treset is fired
when the OS patch completes.
All transitions are assumed to have an exponentially dis-
tributed time duration. We estimate the failure and recovery
rates of both hardware and software for each server based
on [9]. We use the DNS server to demonstrate the input
parameters of the SRN sub-models. From the NVD, we found
one critical vulnerability in Microsoft DNS and two critical
vulnerabilities in its Windows OS. We assume the vulnerability
in the application needs 5 minutes to patch and the vulnerabil-
ity in the OS needs 10 minutes to patch in average. The rate
values of the DNS server are summarized in Table IV.
TABLE IV: Input parameters of the SRN sub-models for the
DNS server.
Component Transition Parameter Value
Hardware Failure 1/λhw 87600 hoursRecovery 1/µhw 1 hour
OS
Failure 1/λos 1440 hours
Recovery 1/µos 1 hour
Patch 1/αos 20 minutes
Reboot after patch 1/βos 10 minutes
Reboot after failure 1/δos 10 minutes
DNS
Failure 1/λdns 336 hours
Recovery 1/µdns 30 minutes
Patch 1/αdns 5 minutes
Reboot after patch 1/βdns 5 minutes
Reboot after failure 1/δdns 5 minutes
Patch clock Time to patch 1/τp 720 hours
2) SRN sub-models for the network: In order to analyze the
availability affected by the patch schedule, we only consider
the states and transitions caused by patch. We generate a two-
state and two-transition CTMC for each server via the SRN
sub-model, where the up state represents the service is up and
the down state represents the service is down due to patch.
The firing rates of transitions Tdnsd , Twebd , Tappd and
Tdbd are marking-dependent. Let λsvceq denote the patch rate,
µsvceq denote the recovery rate. The actual firing rate equals
to λsvceq #Psvcup . In the example network where Ndns = 1,
Nweb = 2, Napp = 2, Ndb = 1, the firing rates of transitions
Tdnsd , Twebd , Tappd and Tdbd are λdnseq , 2λ
web
eq , 2λ
app
eq , λ
db
eq ,
respectively.
We use the aggregation method in [10] to compute the
aggregated rates due to patch. Let psvcup denote the probability
that the service is running, psvcpd denote the probability that
the service is down due to patch, psvcprrb denote the probabil-
ity that the service is ready to reboot after OS patch completes.
We calculate λsvceq by Equation (1) and µ
svc
eq by Equation (2).
The probabilities in the equations can be calculated via the
lower layer SRN sub-models for the server.
λsvceq = τp ∗ psvcup/psvcup = τp (1)
µsvceq = βsvc ∗ psvcprrb/psvcpd (2)
We show an example of calculating the patch rate and
recovery rate for the DNS server by Equations (1) and (2) in
the following. pdnsprrb is the sum of the probabilities including
all states that the DNS is down due to patch (i.e., OS and
service are ready to patch and patched).
λdnseq = τp = 1/720 ≈ 0.001389
µdnseq = βdns ∗ pdnsprrb/pdnspd
≈ 12 ∗ 0.00011563/0.00092506 ≈ 1.49992
We show the patch and recovery rates for all servers in
Table V. We also calculate the mean-time-to-patch (MTTP) us-
ing 1/λsvceq and mean-time-to-recovery (MTTR) using 1/µ
svc
eq .
All services have the same patch rate/MTTP as they are
patched once per month. The application service has the lowest
recovery rate (i.e., the longest MTTR) as the application server
has more critical vulnerabilities to be patched.
We choose the capacity oriented availability (COA) as the
output measure. It can be obtained by computing the expected
steady-state reward rate with the proper choices of reward
rates for the model. We define the reward function of COA
in Table VI where the reward rate is regarded as the number
TABLE V: Aggregated values for the servers.
Service
Rate MTTP Patch MTTR Recovery
(hour) rate (hour) rate
DNS 720 0.00139 0.6667 1.49992
Web 720 0.00139 0.5834 1.71420
Application 720 0.00139 1.0001 0.99995
Database 720 0.00139 0.9167 1.09085
of running servers during patch divided by the total number
of servers. We define four reward rates: 1, 0.83333 (5/6),
0.66667 (4/6) and 0. We use the upper layer SRN sub-models
to calculate COA which approximately equals to 0.99707.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
We can evaluate both the security and capacity oriented
availability of a system under security patch. We assume there
are several systems with different server redundancy. As an
example, we deploy the active-active high availability cluster
for each type of servers separately. We use the proposed
approach to compare the security and capacity oriented avail-
ability for different designs and analyze the impact of security
patch on these designs. We use identical servers for the same
types of servers in different redundancy designs because this
is commonly used in the enterprise networks. Heterogeneous
redundant servers will be used in our future work.
A. Comparison using two metrics
We use the scatter plots to compare the results of one
security metric and the availability metric. ASP and COA
values before and after patch are shown in Figure 6(a) and 6(b).
In Figure 6(a), before patch, all redundancy designs have
the maximum value of attack success probability. This is
an extreme situation as each server initially has at least
one vulnerability with the maximum value of attack success
probability. When calculating the value for the server in an
AT, each server also has the maximum probability value thus
causing the maximum probability value in the system level. In
Figure 6(b), security patch decreases ASP for all redundancy
designs as all critical vulnerabilities are fixed. The increasing
level of redundancy increases COA but reduces ASP . In the
fourth design, COA is higher than the values in other designs
as the application service has the lowest recovery rate shown in
Table V. In addition, the first and second designs have the same
ASP because the DNS server has no exploitable vulnerabilities
after patch. All other designs have higher ASP than the first
non-redundancy design.
We define a function shown in Equation (3) which com-
pares values of metrics with the upper/lower bounds of metrics
defined by the administrator. Let φ denote the upper bound
of ASP , ψ denote the lower bound of COA. The output
of the function is either 1, indicating the design satisfies the
requirements, or 0, indicating the design does not satisfy the
requirements.
f(ASP ,COA) =
{
1, if ASP <= φ and COA >= ψ
0, if ASP > φ or COA < ψ
(3)
We assume two upper bounds of ASP and two lower
bounds of COA for the designs after security patch are defined
by an administrator. Design choices satisfying both security
and availability are shown as follows.
1) φ = 0.2 and ψ = 0.9962 (region 1): 1 DNS + 1 WEB
+ 2 APP + 1 DB; 1 DNS + 1 WEB + 1 APP + 2
DB.
2) φ = 0.1 and ψ = 0.9961 (region 2): 2 DNS + 1 WEB
+ 1 APP + 1 DB.
B. Comparison using multiple security and availability met-
rics
We can also compare the results of multiple metrics via
the radar charts. The output values of six metrics before and
after patch are shown in Figure 7(a) and 7(b).
In Figure 7(a), AIM does not change in all the design
choices. As shown in Section III-C, AIM is the maximum
impact value among all the values in the attack path level.
Before patch, the maximum impact value in the attack path
level is calculated from the longest path including DNS, web,
application and database servers. Each redundancy design has
the same longest attack path which causes the same AIM .
The increasing level of redundancy increases COA but reduces
NoEV and NoAP . In addition, the fourth and fifth designs
have the same NoEP as the first non-redundancy design
because the redundant server is not the entry point.
In Figure 7(b), the values of all security metrics drop after
the patch. As the DNS server has no exploitable vulnerability
after the critical vulnerability is patched, each attack path
only includes web, application and database servers. Therefore
AIM does not change for all designs due to the same attack
path. In addition, the first and second designs have the same
NoAP and NoEV because the DNS server is excluded from
the attack path. All other designs have higher NoAP and
NoEV than the first non-redundancy design. Only the third
design has higher NoEP as the redundant web servers still
have exploitable vulnerabilities.
We define a function shown in Equation (4) which com-
pares values of metrics with the upper/lower bounds of metrics
defined by an administrator. As AIM is the same in all design
choices, we assume the administrator defines the upper bounds
for ASP , NoEV , NoAP and NoEP and the lower bound for
COA. Let ξ denote the upper bound of NoEV , ω denote the
upper bound of NoAP , κ denote the upper bound of NoEP .
f(ASP ,NoEV ,NoAP ,NoEP ,COA) =
1, if ASP <= φ and
NoEV <= ξ and
NoAP <= ω and
NoEP <= κ and
COA >= ψ
0, if ASP > φ or
NoEV > ξ or
NoAP > ω or
NoEP > κ or
COA < ψ
(4)
We assume the administrator defines two upper bounds
of ASP , NoEV , NoAP and NoEP and two lower bounds
of COA for the designs after security patch. The design
choices which satisfy both security and availability are shown
as follows.
TABLE VI: Reward function of COA in the SRN sub-models for the network.
Reward Definition
COA
if (#Pdnsup == 1 && #Pwebup == 2 && #Pappup == 2 && #Pdbup == 1) 1
else if (#Pdnsup == 1 && #Pwebup == 1 && #Pappup == 2 && #Pdbup == 1) 0.83333
else if (#Pdnsup == 1 && #Pwebup == 2 && #Pappup == 1 && #Pdbup == 1) 0.83333
else if (#Pdnsup == 1 && #Pwebup == 1 && #Pappup == 1 && #Pdbup == 1) 0.66667 else 0
(a) Before patch. (b) After patch.
Fig. 6: Comparison of multiple redundancy designs using ASP and COA.
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Fig. 7: Comparison of multiple redundancy designs using various metrics.
1) φ = 0.2 and ξ = 9 and ω = 2 and κ = 1 and
ψ = 0.9962: 1 DNS + 1 WEB + 2 APP + 1 DB.
2) φ = 0.1 and ξ = 7 and ω = 1 and κ = 1 and
ψ = 0.9961: 2 DNS + 1 WEB + 1 APP + 1 DB.
C. Summary
From the above numerical analysis, there is a balance
between the security and capacity oriented availability of
redundancy designs under security patch. As the redundancy
designs may bring negative effect on security in terms of
attack success probability, number of exploitable vulnerabil-
ities, number of attack paths and number of entry points,
high security and availability cannot be achieved at the same
time. We have several observations that will facilitate an
administrator’s decision making on redundancy designs under
security patch.
• Increasing the redundancy of the server with lowest
recovery rate (i.e., longest mean time to patch critical
vulnerabilities and reboot) has better improvement on
the capacity oriented availability of the network under
security patch;
• The redundant servers with no exploitable vulnerabili-
ties after patch do not decrease security while improve
the system availability.
V. LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
We plan to complete the following extensions in our future
work.
Systems: in the current analysis, we use small-scale enter-
prise networks with identical redundant servers. Larger number
of servers and heterogeneous redundancy will be introduced
and evaluated. Besides, we will apply the proposed approach
to real networks to analyze the impact of security patch on
security and availability when introducing redundant servers
and compare different design choices.
SRN models: there are several limitations about the current
SRN model. The SRN model only works for specific patch
scenarios as mentioned in the assumptions. Sometimes a server
might only have OS vulnerabilities or application vulnerabili-
ties to be patched. Some patches might not need to reboot the
application or the OS. We will re-design the SRN model to
accommodate the complex scenarios in the real world.
User oriented performance: the current work does not
consider the performance of the redundancy design under
client requests. We can use queuing network to model the
arrival and processing of client requests and compute per-
formance measures (e.g., mean response time, mean waiting
time).
Other metrics: more metrics can be used for the model-
based evaluation. For example, the operational cost can be
added as the output measure of the SRN model to compare
the costs of different redundancy designs. Besides, we will use
economic metrics to help the administrators make decisions on
redundancy designs (e.g., gain of high availability versus cost
of redundancy; loss of successful attacks versus cost of security
patch).
Patch schedule: we use monthly patch schedule in the
analysis. Other patch schedules can also be used in the
evaluation. Impact of different patch schedules on security and
availability can be compared.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Security patch can improve the security of enterprise net-
works but introduce downtime. Redundancy designs can be
used to improve the availability under security patch. However,
introducing redundant servers also increases the attack surface.
It is important to find the balance between the security and
availability affected by the security patch.
In this paper, we have shown both security and availability
models to assess the security and capacity oriented availability
of multiple design choices for the server redundancy under the
security patch. We have carried out model-based evaluation
using five design choices with different number of redundant
servers. We have used scatter plots to compare two metrics
and radar charts to compare multiple metrics. The results have
shown most redundancy designs increase capacity oriented
availability but decrease security under security patch. The
exception is that if the redundant server has no exploitable vul-
nerability after patch, this redundancy design will not decrease
security while improving the system availability. Besides, we
have defined functions which compare values of metrics with
the upper/lower bounds to find design choices that satisfy both
security and availability requirements.
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